This paper presents a theoretical model to show how distributional concerns can engender social con ‡ict. We have a two period model, where the cost of con ‡ict is endogenous in the sense that parties involved have full control over the level of con ‡ict they can create. Our analysis highlights the crucial role of future inequality. It is shown, equality of assets or income in the current period does not stop con ‡ict from taking place if the anticipated future inequality is signi…cant. Further we …nd that the impact of inequality on con ‡ict is not straightforward. Since con ‡ict is costly for both groups, societies with low levels of inequality show no con ‡ict; groups engage in con ‡ict only when inequality exceeds a certain threshold level. Additionally the model shows that the link between inequality and con ‡ict may be non-monotonic.
Introduction
This paper presents a simple model showing how distributional concerns can engender social con ‡ict. We focus on the phenomena of intra-state con ‡ict that has become common in recent years (Stewart et al. 2001) . It is usually manifested in terms of widescale demonstrations, protests, strikes and sometimes violent rebellions, leading to severe disruption of economic activity. 1 This can weaken a country's institutions and severely impede its economic progress. In fact, many of the states in the poorest regions of the world have gone through serious intra-state con ‡ict in the recent past. While it may be plausible that con ‡ict may exacerbate the existing levels of poverty and inequality, a number of studies have demonstrated the opposite. MacCullouch (2001) after controlling for several factors such as income, military expenditure and country and time speci…c e¤ects, observed that higher inequality can lead to higher con ‡ict. Nafziger and Auvinen (2000) using an improved inequality data set and a broader de…nition of con ‡ict …nd a strong link between inequality and war. Other studies such as Alesina and Perrotti (1996) , Cramer (2003) and World Bank (2003) , point to economic inequality as an important cause of con ‡ict. 2 In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to analyze the link between inequality and con‡ict. In particular our emphasis is on wealth inequality and con ‡ict. In mainly agrarian economies, for example, land inequality closely re ‡ects wealth inequality and the distribution of land can be a source of discontent. In Central American countries, such as El Salvador and Guatemala, strong reliance on agro based exports led to an extremely disproportionate amount of land in the hands of a few rich and powerful interests. This resulted in serious con ‡ict with those who have been dispossessed (Brockett 1988) . In a recent study Macours (2011) …nds that the growing inequality between the landed and landless fueled the Maoist movement in Nepal. But inequality in assets is not just limited to land inequality. One of the important reasons for con ‡ict in Angola and the D.R. Congo was for the control of the natural resources. 3 The share (or the lack of share) of the di¤erent groups in these resources can be seen as the source of asset inequality.
The emphasis on asset based inequality does not in any way reduce the importance of other factors, historical, ethnic or religious, in creating con ‡ict. In fact our analysis presumes the polarization of a society into rival groups. 4 How these groups are formed and the ensuing tensions between them are an essential part of any description of con ‡ict. We take these group formations as given. 5 In essence, therefore, this paper models the impact of group inequality (or horizontal inequality) on con ‡ict. There is a growing body of evidence which implies that more than inequality among households (or individuals) , what matters for con ‡ict is the inequality among groups. The groups here are broadly de…ned and presumes a fractionalization along ethnic, religious or economic class lines.
Using national surveys for 55 developing countries, Ostby (2007 Ostby ( , 2008 …nds strong evidence that countries with high levels of systematic between group inequalities in terms of households assets and 1 We do not distinguish between violent and non-violent con ‡ict here. See and Sachs (1989) . 2 Collier and Hoe-er (2000) do not …nd any signi…cant impact of inequality on con ‡ict. However, for the problems with their paper refer to Cramer (2003) and Nafziger and Auvinen (2002, p.156) . 4 Esteban and Ray (1999) discuss how the distribution of the population across di¤erent groups e¤ect con ‡ict. They …nd that con ‡ict is the highest under a symmetric bimodal distribution, i.e. when the society is polarized. Empirical evidence of polarization (based on ethnic lines) leading to con ‡ict has been reported by Matlova and Reynal-Querol (2005) . 5 For the dynamics of group formations see Gar…nkle (2004a Gar…nkle ( , 2004b .
education does have a higher probability of an outbreak of civil war. More detailed case studies have also established the importance of group inequality in fostering con ‡ict Stewart 2001 ). In a recent paper using a rich cross-country data set and a better indicator of group inequality Cederman et al. (2011) …nds a strong link between group inequality and con ‡ict. To demonstrate how group inequality and con ‡ict are interlinked, we use a two-period game framework which is similar to Gar…nkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) . 6 However, unlike those models, the groups here directly choose the level of con ‡ict, rather than choosing between productive and defensive activities. 7 Another di¤erence with the previous papers lie in how the joint output is distributed. In standard choice theoretic models, the share of each group depends on the amount of resources the groups invest in enhancing their relative capability to capture a larger share of the output. In contrast, we presume an underlying social contract between the groups when it comes to the distribution of joint outputs. This contract may be arrived at through some bargaining process between the groups. In this sense our model is closer to Banerjee and Du ‡o (2003) and Rodrik (1998) . The shares of the groups, in our model, depend on the relative levels of wealth. If a group is relatively wealthy, then presumably it can have more leverage in the bargaining and thus be able to appropriate a larger share of the output. The current level of group wealth inequality is then re ‡ected in a more skewed distribution of income between the groups in the future. Whilst Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) discuss distributional issues in the context of con ‡ict, it is in a static framework. Also, unlike their model, ours does not allow con ‡ict in the absence of inequality. 8 In addition, one of the features of their model is that groups with higher appropriative capabilities enjoy a larger share of the output. By specifying a stable social contract through the distribution rule, our model refrains from such an anarchic situation.
Yet we are able to demonstrate how future group wealth (asset) inequality can tip a peaceful society into con ‡ict. Since higher inequality leads to a more skewed distribution of the joint output, beyond a certain level of inequality the costs of engaging in con ‡ict are less than the bene…ts of a higher share of the output resulting from the con ‡ict. We proceed to show that even if wealth and income were equally shared, con ‡ict may still arise, so long as there is a possibility of future inequality. This is similar to Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) who …nd that "a longer shadow of the future can in fact harm cooperation and intensify con ‡ict". Taking the analysis further, we argue that con ‡ict just does not simply increase with inequality and the disadvantaged groups are not the only ones to engage in con ‡ict. At higher levels of inequality both the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups may engage in con ‡ict which is what we often see when repressive measures are undertaken by the advantaged group (and in many cases by governments aligned to the advantaged group) to suppress the con ‡ict initiated by the disadvantaged group. We also …nd that as inequality rises the potential increase in con ‡ict may be high enough to act as a disincentive for groups to participate in production processes, the sharing of the output of which is the main source of con ‡ict. We show that the link between inequality and con ‡ict is non-monotonic. 9 6 We, therefore, broadly follow the choice theoretic approach. For other approaches to modelling con ‡ict and inequality see Benabou (1996) and Somanathan (2002) among others.
7 Addison et al.(2003) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) also take a similar approach as ours. 8 In a similar context, Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) present a dynamic model, but they also allow for con ‡ict under perfect equality. Further, unlike ours, the groups in their paper do not incur any cost in the current period to initiate con ‡ict. 9 In a similar vein Milante (2004) also …nds a non-monotonic relation between wealth inequality and con ‡ict. However, the structure of his model and the general result di¤er signi…cantly from ours.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic structure of the model used in the paper including the production technology, the consumption decisions made by the groups, the social contract and the stages of the game between the groups. In Section 3, we analyze in detail how future group inequality and current levels of con ‡ict may be related. The following Section discusses some extensions of the model and Section 5 concludes the paper with some discussion about the policy implications of our results. For the rest of the paper, inequality will imply wealth inequality between groups.
Model: Basic Framework
Consider two groups, i and j, involved in the production of output over time periods, t = f1; 2g. The groups are endowed with one unit of indivisible human capital each period. They can produce the output jointly or fall back on their own production. If they decide for joint production, then their share of the joint output in each period is determined by a rule based on their wealth in that period w i t and w j t . We assume that there is no wealth inequality to begin with. Thus w i 1 = w j 1 = w 0 .
Production
For the joint production case, we assume that the groups divide an exogenously given level of output say R t in each period. Further, R t+1 R t , that is in each period the joint production is at least as large as the previous period. Let h m t 2 f0; 1g represent the level of human capital used for joint production by any group m = i; j. The joint output is given by
When either h i t = 0 or h j t = 0, Y t = 0. If joint output is produced, it is equal to R t . Output under own production for group m is
Thus when e¤ort in joint production h m t = 0, own output for group m will be w m t . On the other hand if h m t = 1, Y m t = 0. We assume that the joint output is far greater than the combined total of each group's own production, that is R t w i t + w j t . Wealth levels do not e¤ect the joint output, but it does e¤ect the level of own production. 10 Both groups receive a part of the joint output according to some distribution rule, which is discussed next.
Social Contract
Social contract or the sharing rule is of crucial importance in any con ‡ict model. This paper will not be an exception in that regard. In the literature, the exogenous distribution rules (known as 'contest success functions') are represented by proportional sharing rules, with an emphasis on a winner-takesall feature. 11 This type of sharing rules is appropriate in analyzing situations of war, where there is an element that the victor commands all the resources. However, most con ‡ict that we see today is intra-state con ‡ict, be it peaceful protests or civil war. For such cases the winner-takes-all feature may not be appropriate, since the loser may still be receiving some share of the resources, albeit a very small one. This feature is particularly desirable for con ‡ict situations and not all distribution rules share that property (Hirshleifer 1989 ).
In our model, similar to Banerjee and Du ‡o (2003) , we propose an exogenous sharing rule for the joint output based on the fact that if either of the groups decides not to take part in the joint production, their fall back option is their own production. Keeping this aspect in mind, we propose the 'split-the-di¤erence'sharing rule,
where i and j's share of the joint output, given by d i t and d j t , depends on the di¤erence in the outputs from own production between the two groups (which in turn depends on the wealth levels). 12 Equal levels of wealth will result in an equal distribution of the pie. We would assume that the share of the joint output that each group receives is greater than their respective level of own production, that is,
; 2, which would incline the groups towards joint production. Note that both groups have equal bargaining power under this sharing rule, but more general rules can be used.
Con ‡ict
While both the groups have some control over the production aspect (in the sense that they can choose between joint and own production), they have little control over the sharing rule of the joint output. In such a case, if group i is unhappy with its share of the joint output, d i t , it can resort to con ‡ict. It is important to note that as in Banerjee and Du ‡o (2003) , con ‡ict does not a¤ect the sharing rule. In this model con ‡ict takes the form of destruction of the other group's share of the joint output. There is, however, no direct appropriation of the opponent's share. Our model, therefore, does not discuss looting. 13 When one group indulges in con ‡ict, it not only harms their opponent, but also adversely e¤ects its own income, albeit not to the same extent.
Let n i t and n where k < 1 re ‡ects limited self damage. For simplicity, the rest of the analysis will assume the proportion of 'self-damage'k = (1=2). Each group, however, has to incur a mobilization cost for engaging in con ‡ict. We model the cost as (n m t ) 2 d m t =2 where it is increasing in the level of con ‡ict and the group's share of the joint output, d m t . It re ‡ects the intuition that to mobilise, groups may have to sacri…ce a part of their joint output. This is evident in many con ‡icts when groups often sell rights on the contested resources to third parties in return for up-front …nancial support needed for mobilisation (Ross 2003) .
Further, we assume that no group has the ability to destroy each other's wealth. It is often the case in con ‡ict that wealth or resources of groups are based in territories over which they have exclusive control. 14 Thus it may be that each group's own wealth are better protected than their respective shares from the joint output. Anbarci et al. (2002) makes a similar assumption where they consider endowments of the groups to be 'inalienable'. Hence if own production takes place then the net income of each group will be y 
Under own production, there will be no con ‡ict since it is costly in terms of mobilization and there is no associated bene…ts as the wealth levels remain unchanged. The total amount of con ‡ict in period t in the society, denoted by n t , should involve some aggregation of the level of con ‡ict by both groups. Although di¤erent aggregation rules are possible, in this paper we consider the 'additive'aggregation rule, where the total con ‡ict is the sum of the level of con ‡ict engaged in by each group.
Consumption and Savings
Both groups choose a level of consumption (and therefore a certain level of savings) and a level of con ‡ict in each period, to maximize the group's lifetime utility. Since period 2 is the …nal period, there will be no savings and hence both groups will consume their total income in that period. The groups, however, have to incur a mobilization cost for engaging in con ‡ict. Similar to Dixit (2004, p. 41) we assume that the utility is linear in consumption and the cost of mobilization increases at an increasing rate with the level of con ‡ict. Thus any group m = i; j, would maximize the following, where c m 1 and s m 1 are the level of consumption and savings for group m in period 1 and < 1 is the discount factor.
For analytical tractability we will also assume that for both groups savings is proportional to the level of income, i.e. s m 1 = y m 1 for all m = i; j where (1=2). 15 1 4 For instance, FARC rebels controlled vast parts of southern and eastern Columbia (Veillette, 2005) . Similarly, LTTE had de-facto ruled northern and eastern Sri Lanka (Stokke, 2006) . 
Inequality
We de…ne wealth inequality, I t , as the di¤erence in wealth levels in period t,
Since w j 1 = w i 1 = w 0 there is no wealth inequality in the initial period. Thus I 1 = 0. The inequality in period 2, however, will be determined by the di¤erence in w j 2 and w i 2 which in turn are a¤ected by the level of con ‡ict in period 1. The greater the amount of con ‡ict, the lower will be the 'net income'of the groups (see (5) and (6)) and hence the lower will be the amount of savings. In other words under joint production savings by each group in period 1 is negatively related to the level of con ‡ict n i 1 and n j 1 . However, if joint production fails, there is no con ‡ict and savings then would be a proportion of the outside option which is w 0 . Thus for all m = i; j,
r m is the interest factor on the gross savings in period t.
To distinguish between pre-con ‡ict and post con ‡ict inequality in period 2, we introduce the concept of anticipated inequality which captures the level of inequality that would exist if there was no con ‡ict. The initial level of future wealth inequality before any con ‡ict will be instrumental in deciding whether the groups want to engage in con ‡ict or not in the …rst place. Suppose there is no con ‡ict in period 1, i.e. n i 1 = n j 1 = 0, then from (5) and (6) we know y i 1 = y j 1 = (R 1 =2). Thus savings for both groups in period 1 would be s i 1 (0; 0) = s j 1 (0; 0) = (R 1 =2). The anticipated level of wealth inequality in period 2 when there is no con ‡ict in period 1 is represented as
Note that there is heterogeneity in returns to the savings of the two groups. This will be the crucial element which will drive the con ‡ict in this paper. As in Saint Paul and Verdier (1997) this di¤erence in the rate of returns could be thought of as arising out of di¤erential access to capital markets. For rest of the paper we will assume, without loss of generality, that group j is the fortunate (or the advantaged) group and group i is the unfortunate (or the disadvantaged) group, i.e. r j > r i . For the sake of simplifying the analysis we normalise the return of the disadvantaged group to r i = 1, which means that the disadvantaged group gets no return on their savings. 16
The Game
We represent the interaction between the two groups as a game G. Given that the distribution rule is …xed, G is a two period game with each period consisting of the following two stages:
Stage 1: Knowing the distribution, the groups can decide either to produce on their own (h i t = 0, or h j t = 0), or to produce jointly (h i t = 1, and h j t = 1). It does not make sense to have a situation consumption), we can show s c. It can be checked that the results that follow under the assumption st = :yt for both groups, will also go through for this alternative speci…cation.
1 6 However, this is not a severe restriction. All the analysis below will go through so long as the return the disadvantaged group receives is less than 100%. More precisely, the analysis below will hold for all r i 2 [1; 2 ] where =
(1 ) :
where one group goes for joint production and the other group goes for own production. Thus we rule out such situations.
Stage 2: If they decide to produce jointly, then each party decides on the level of con ‡ict, that is, (n i 1 and n i 2 ) for group i and (n j 1 and n j 2 ) for group j. The strategy for each group is to choose in both periods whether to take part in the joint production and the level of con ‡ict. Let (n i t ; n j t ) represent the equilibrium level of con ‡ict and h i t ; and h j t represent the equilibrium human capital input of group i and j respectively for the joint output.
De…nition 1 A subgame perfect equilibrium is given by the quadruplet (n i t ; n j We shall use the backward induction approach to …nd the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. 17
Future Inequality and Equilibrium Level of Current Con ‡ict
In this section we demonstrate the role of future inequality in engendering con ‡ict and investigate how con ‡ict evolves with the changes in future inequality. We …nd that under certain restrictions on the parameters, for zero or very low levels of inequality neither group engages in con ‡ict, for higher but still low inequality only the disadvantaged group engages in con ‡ict in equilibrium; however, when levels of inequality are high, both groups engage in the con ‡ict. Later we use these results to uncover the link between inequality and total con ‡ict.
As groups engage in con ‡ict, the realised level of future inequality will di¤er from the anticipated level of future inequality prior to any con ‡ict. This is because con ‡ict will bring down the level of inequality by reducing the overall level of income and thus savings. Our interest in this section is with the level of future inequality that groups anticipate before they engage in con ‡ict. First we show that in the most general case the groups will not engage in con ‡ict in the …nal period irrespective of the level of inequality.
Proposition 1 No group will engage in con ‡ict in the last period.
Proof. Suppose both groups are engaged in joint production in period 2. Using (5) and (9)
Since any increase in n j 2 will reduce V j 2 , group j will not engage in con ‡ict. The same will hold true for group i. Hence, n i 2 = n j 2 = 0. If one of the groups decides to engage in its own production in period 2, then by de…nition n i 2 = n j 2 = 0.
As there are no bene…ts from con ‡ict in the last period, none of the groups engage in con ‡ict. What about con ‡ict in period 1? Consider group i. Given (5), (9) and c i 1 = (1 )y i 1 , in period 1, group i will choose 0 n i 1 1 such that it maximizes the following:
The …rst order condition for group i will be
Similarly the …rst order condition for group j will be
The best-response functions of each group can be derived from their …rst order conditions. Rearranging (11)),
This can be written as, 
A represents the amount of con ‡ict group i will engage in when it initiates the con ‡ict and B is the change in n i 1 resulting from a change in n j 1 . Whether A 7 0 and B 7 0, depends on the level of I a 2 . From (11) it can be deduced that, I a 2 7 (2 1) =2 implies A 7 0. Thus, when inequality is lower, the damaging impact of con ‡ict by group i on current consumption is far greater than the positive impact on future consumption that such con ‡ict generates. For higher levels of inequality, the positive impact of increased future consumption dominates.
On the other hand, how n i 1 responds to changes in n j 1 > 0 depends on whether B 7 0, and thus whether 2 7 I a 2 . For I a 2 < 2 , an increase in n j 1 will also increase n i 1 , while for I a 2 > 2 an increase in n j 1 will have an opposite impact on n i 1 . This is because for group i, from (11) it is evident that, when inequality is lower, the marginal bene…t of increasing n i 1 in response to an increase in n j 1 on current consumption is greater than the marginal cost on future consumption. As inequality increases the marginal cost in terms of reduced future consumption increases. Thus, beyond a certain level of inequality, group i is better o¤ by reducing n i 1 in response to an increase in n j 1 . Rearranging (12) we get,
which can be written as n 
It is useful to start the analysis of con ‡ict and equilibrium with the case where anticipated inequality is at its lowest, that is I a 2 = 0. For this special case, from (13) and (14) we can show that A = C and B = D. Thus the intercept and gradient of the best response functions are the same for both groups. This leads to the best response functions of the two groups as shown in Figure 1 .
Insert Figure 1.
Note that given 0 n i 1 ; n j 1 1, the intercept term for the best response for group j is ( C=D) and for group i is ( A=B). As is evident from the …gure above, the unique intersection of best responses is at the origin. Thus, under joint production in period 1 there will be no con ‡ict.
As inequality rises, A will increase and become positive. Let I a 2 be the level of inequality when A = 0. With further increase in inequality, A will eventually be greater than ( C=D). Suppose b I a 2 is the level of inequality such that ( C=D) = A. We show below that with higher inequality, con ‡ict will occur which will reduce the income from the joint output. Thus for both groups the gap between the joint output and own production will narrow. Let e I a 2 re ‡ect the level of inequality where atleast for one of the groups, the payo¤ from joint production under con ‡ict is the same as the outside option. In the next three sections we use these threshold levels of anticipated inequality I a 2 , 0 < I a 2 < b I a 2 < e I a 2 , to show how con ‡ict evolves with increase in inequality. In particular, we discuss three regimes with the following broad features: low inequality, where 0 I a 2 I a 2 , leads to joint production with no con ‡ict in equilibrium, as for ; medium inequality, where I a 2 < I a 2 b I a 2 , again leads to joint production in equilibrium, but now with positive con ‡ict from the disadvantaged group only; high inequality, where b I a 2 < I a 2 , implies joint production still, but now with both groups engaged in positive con ‡ict if b I a 2 < I a 2 < e I a 2 , and equilibrium collapses to own production if e I a 2 I a 2 .
Low Inequality and Con ‡ict
When the level of inequality is low, such that I a 2 I a 2 , none of the groups will engage in con ‡ict. As anticipated inequality increases from 0, best responses change gradually. Most important in this …rst regime is the fact that the intercept term A of group i, increases and reaches 0 when I a 2 = (2 1) =2 I a 2 . For between 0 and I a 2 , best response for both groups produce the same qualitative outcome as Figure 1 , namely zero con ‡ict. Thus the only equilibrium is at the point where n i 1 = 0 and n j 1 = 0. Therefore, total con ‡ict under low inequality is n 1 = n i 1 + n j 1 = 0. To see whether the groups will engage in joint or own production, …rst consider period 1. Since n i 1 = n j 1 = 0, the share of each group from the joint output will be R 1 =2. On the other hand under own production they will get w 0 . Thus the groups will engage in joint production if R 1 2w 0 . Since we know that for all t, R t w i t + w j t , the condition for joint production is thus satis…ed for both period 1.
In period 2, from Proposition 1 we know there will be no con ‡ict. Therefore, using (5), (6) and (10) we can show that group i (the disadvantaged group) and j will receive (R 2 I a 2 )=2 and (R 2 +I a 2 )=2 respectively. The period 2 wealth of group i and j is respectively w i 2 and w j 2 . Note that the wealth are also the outside options of the groups. The joint production would be realised if (R 2 I a 2 ) > 2w i 2 and (R 2 + I a 2 ) > 2w j 2 , which implies R 2 > w i 2 + w j 2 . Thus irrespective of the level of savings and con ‡ict in period 1, in period 2 there will always be joint production.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For the level of inequality I a 2 I a 2 = (2 1) =2, the subgame perfect equilibrium is (n i 1 = 0; n
In this case group i, the disadvantaged group, would not initiate con ‡ict since the di¤erence in inequality is not high enough to merit engaging in con ‡ict, a part of the cost of which it has to bear. Since the disadvantaged group does not initiate con ‡ict, the advantaged group does not engage in con ‡ict. Thus in equilibrium there is no con ‡ict and joint production takes place.
The condition I a 2 = (2 1) =2 re ‡ects the fact that if the future is less valuable, for instance when ! 0, then there would be greater tolerance for inequality, since the level of inequality, where no con ‡ict takes place, I a 2 , will increase. On the other hand, when ! 1 the groups value the future more, which will result in less tolerance for future inequality since I a 2 will decrease.
Medium Inequality and Con ‡ict
As the level of inequality, I a 2 , increase we move from low inequality to a medium inequality regime where I The best response function of group i (13) translates to an intercept A with gradient (1=B) in Figure 2 . Given the bounds on the level of inequality, it is easy to establish that 0 < A 1 and 0 < B < 1. Similarly, the best response function of group j (14) has intercept 0 < ( C=D) < 1 where C < 0 and gradient D < 1. Notice that in the presence of non-negativity constraints on levels of con ‡ict, C < 0 implies that the best response function for group j extends to the origin, with a kink at n i 1 = ( C=D). Further, one can show that, given > 1, ( C=D) > A. 18 Next consider the case where 2 < I a 2 b I a 2 . As noted before, b I a 2 represents the level of inequality such that ( C=D) = A. 19 The implication of I a 2 > 2 is that the slope of the group i's reaction function now becomes negative. So beyond this point, if the advantaged group engages in con ‡ict, the disadvantaged group will reduce its level of con ‡ict. Figure 3 shows the reaction functions of the two groups in this situation.
Insert Figure 3 .
1 8 Also note that D < 1 < (1=B), i.e. group i's reaction function is steeper than group j's. This re ‡ects the fact that group j has more to lose by escalating the con ‡ict and hence would increase its own level of con ‡ict at a lower rate than group i. From Figures 2 and 3 , it becomes clear that in case of the joint production, (n i 1 = A; n j 1 = 0) is the equilibrium level of con ‡ict. Group j, the advantaged group, does not engage in con ‡ict. The intuition is simple; ( C=D) re ‡ects the level of con ‡ict engaged by group i that will be tolerated by group j. Hence, so long as the level of con ‡ict (which is group i's intercept term A) is less than ( C=D), group j shall not engage in con ‡ict.
If there is joint production, the overall level of con ‡ict will be
Di¤erentiating with respect to I a 2 we get @n 1 =@I a 2 = =2 > 0, i.e. as the level of future inequality increases, overall con ‡ict will also rise.
However, whether both the groups will decide for joint production or not depends on their initial level of wealth. In period 1, the disadvantaged group under joint production in equilibrium will engage in con ‡ict, i.e. (n i 1 = A; n j 1 = 0) and thus from (9) will thus receive (1 (A=2))(R 1 =2). Therefore, the disadvantaged group will participate in joint production if (1 (A=2))R 1 > 2w 0 . For the advantaged the condition will be (1 A)R 1 > 2w 0 . In the second period, as shown earlier, there is no con ‡ict and both groups engage in joint production since R 2 > w i 2 + w j 2 continues to hold. The equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
Here while one of the groups engages in con ‡ict, the other refrains from con ‡ict. This is unlike Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) , where both groups always end up engaging in con ‡ict, although only one group might have initiated it. If there is joint production, then the equilibrium levels of con ‡ict for both groups (from the best response functions (13) and (14)) are
High Inequality and Con ‡ict
where C < 0 and B < 0. Since ( C=D) < A and B < A, we can be sure that n i 1 > 0 and n j 1 > 0. At higher levels of inequality, the level of con ‡ict initiated by group i, is greater than what group j can tolerate, that is, A > ( C=D). Hence group j engages in con ‡ict to counter the con ‡ict initiated 2 0 I2 (the maximum level of inequality) is the level of inequality such that max(n by group i. One can easily check that 0 < n i 1 A 1 and 0 < n j 1 1. The overall level of con ‡ict will be the total of (16) and (17) i.e.
In the Appendix (Proposition A3) we show that (@n 1 =@I a 2 ) > 0. This means that as inequality increases further, the level of con ‡ict also increases. Note, here the disadvantaged group reduces its own level of con ‡ict. Since in this case ( B) < 1, the decrease of con ‡ict by the disadvantaged group is more than made up by the increase in the advantaged group's con ‡ict. Therefore, the overall level of con ‡ict increases by more than it would have under the increased level of inequality if the advantaged group did not join in.
On the question of joint or own production under high inequality, it can be shown that when a group reaches I a 2 , they prefer own production (see Appendix, Proposition A4). This is because the excessive level of inequality leads to such a high level of con ‡ict thereby reducing the net income of the groups from joint production to such a level that own production becomes a better alternative. Since both groups engage in joint production at b I a 2 but decide for own production at I a 2 , there must exist some e I a 2 2 b
where for any group m, V m S and V m J represents its total bene…t from own production and joint production respectively. This condition shows the level of inequality in which at least one of the groups will be indi¤erent between joint production and own production.
We therefore discuss the possibility of two cases: (a) b I a 2 < I a 2 < e I a 2 and (b) e I a 2 I a 2 I a 2 . As earlier, in both these cases, in the second period there is no con ‡ict and both groups engage in joint production. When b I a 2 < I a 2 < e I a 2 both groups will continue to be in joint production and the equilibrium will be as given next.
Proposition 4 Given b I a 2 < I a 2 < e I a 2 , the subgame perfect equilibrium is (n i 1 > 0; n
Note that with a higher initial wealth w 0 , the inequality e I a 2 where the switch from joint production to own production takes place is lowered. Thus for wealthier societies, the inequality interval over which both groups would engage in con ‡ict would be reduced.
When e I a 2 I a 2 I a 2 , clearly either group i or group j drops out of joint production. Since in our model own wealth is indestructible, and con ‡ict is costly, we get the following equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Given e I a 2 I a 2 I a 2 , the subgame perfect equilibrium is (n i 1 = 0; n
The above proposition shows that under some circumstances there will be no joint production in period 1. Hence, unlike other cases, although ex-ante there is a possibility of con ‡ict, ex-post no con ‡ict will take place.
Inequality and Total Con ‡ict
So where does all this leave us when it comes to the question about the link between inequality and con ‡ict? As is clear from the above discussion, until I a 2 , there will be no con ‡ict, since inequality is low. However, beyond I a 2 , we know there is a positive amount of con ‡ict since the disadvantaged group engages in con ‡ict. Con ‡ict now increases steadily with an increase in inequality until b I a 2 . Then from b I a 2 onwards both groups are engaged in con ‡ict and the overall level of con ‡ict also increases. Now as inequality increases, con ‡ict again steadily rises until it reaches e I a 2 . At e I a 2 , for group i, high levels of con ‡ict make joint production inviable. This is captured in Figure 5 below.
Insert Figure 5.
Therefore one can state the following proposition.
Proposition 6
The relationship between inequality and con ‡ict is non-monotonic.
We would like to emphasize that the non-monotonicity in our model results from a sharp change in the level of con ‡ict arising out of groups preferring own production beyond a certain level of inequality. Although Milante (2004) also …nds a non-monotonic relationship, unlike ours this is re ‡ected in an inverted-U relationship between inequality and con ‡ict. Hence, in his model, over a certain level of inequality, there is a gradual decrease of con ‡ict as inequality rises.
Discussions
In this section we discuss changes to some assumptions so far made in this model and how they impact on the results. In particular we deal with four of the assumptions: (a) the rate of savings are the same for both the groups, (b) the proportion of 'self damage'is equal for both groups, (c) that groups have foresight, and (d) the absence of …xed costs.
Rate of savings. Suppose instead of having the same savings rate, consider without loss of generality, that i < j . Further assume that r j = r i = 1. This would mean that w i 2 < w j 2 , and therefore from the distribution rule it would be obvious that y i 2 < y j 2 . Group i again is the disadvantaged group. The rest of the analysis will follow through, so long as our inequality now measures the di¤erence between the two savings rates, i.e. I a 2 = ( j i ) where = R 1 =2. Along with this if we had assumed that r j > 1 the results in the previous sections would only be ampli…ed. However, if i > j and at the same time r j > 1, the results derived in the earlier sections will now depend on which of these has greater impact. Obviously, since the relative rate of return and the relative rate of savings are going in opposite directions, the results in the earlier sections will be dampened. Since we were interested in understanding the impact of inequality on con ‡ict, distilling all else, we had assumed i = j . Proportion of 'self damage'. Thus far we have assumed that the proportion of self damage, k, is the same for all the groups and k = (1=2). As mentioned earlier, for 0 < k < 1, all the results derived earlier will hold. Here we shall discuss a few cases when k takes extreme values and when the k varies between groups.
First, when k = 0 for both groups, the reaction function of group i and j are, respectively, (derived from (13) and (14)) n i 1 = ( =2)r j > 0 and n j 1 = ( =2) > 0. Clearly, now both groups will engage in con ‡ict irrespective of the level of inequality and the level of con ‡ict will depend on the rate of return of the rival group. This is not surprising, since k > 0 makes it costly for groups to engage in con ‡ict by reducing both their current and future levels of consumption. The overall level of con ‡ict will be higher now. Next, let k = 1 for both the groups. Recall that the way con ‡ict works in this model is that under high inequality, the disadvantaged group wants to reduce the amount of income devoted to savings by the advantaged group so that, even with a relatively higher return, the advantaged group does not receive a higher level of the output in the future. Now with k = 1, this will be extremely costly. Under this assumption, so long as r j > 1, from (13) and (14) the reactions functions of group i and j will be
Thus, group i, the disadvantaged group will be the only group involved in con ‡ict and that too when I a 2 > 2 . Group j, irrespective of the level of inequality and group i's level of con ‡ict, will not engage in con ‡ict. It is easy to see if the level of self damage of group i is, k i = 0 and of group j is, k j = 1, then the earlier result will be ampli…ed in the sense that now group i will engage in con ‡ict irrespective of the level of inequality and group j will never engage in con ‡ict. On the other hand, if k i = 1 and k j = 0, group j will always engage in con ‡ict and group i will engage in con ‡ict only when inequality is high, i.e. I a 2 > 2 . In this situation, unlike the standard results, it will be the advantaged group which will engage in con ‡ict.
Information. Our model assumes that groups have perfect foresight. Hence they can anticipate future inequalities perfectly. This, however, is not very realistic. One way to bring in imperfect information in the model would be to assume that both the groups know the distributions of r j and r i . In that case the anticipated future inequality will then be given by I a 2 = (E(r j ) E(r i ))w, where E(r) is the expected rate of return. Thus the conditions under which groups will initiate con ‡ict will remain the same except for inequality being interpreted as expected anticipated future inequality. Hence, all the results that we have discussed earlier will also go through for a case of imperfect foresight. In the event of complete uncertainty, however, the analysis will be more complex and will depend on the group's behaviour. If, for instance, the groups presume that the rates of returns are going to be the same, then obviously there will be no reason for con ‡ict arising from future inequality.
Fixed Cost. In our model both groups have to bear a cost to engage in con ‡ict. Without it, groups would always engage in con ‡ict. We have considered the cost of con ‡ict entering the model in two ways. First, a group engaging in con ‡ict will also in ‡ict some damage to their own share of output and, second, there is a mobilization cost of con ‡ict. In a broad sense both these costs can be classi…ed as variable costs, that is the higher the level of con ‡ict the greater will be these costs. Both groups, however, will also typically incur a set of …xed costs if they decide to engage in con ‡ict. The …xed costs may re ‡ect, among others, the costs involved in forming the groups, and the minimum physical infrastructure that may be needed to run a con ‡ict. Boix et al. (2006) argues that any group engaging in con ‡ict will face both …xed and variable costs. In our model, so far, we have just considered the variable costs. Now suppose that the mobilization of the cost of con ‡ict includes a …xed cost F in addition to the variable cost of (n m t ) 2 d m t =2 that is considered in the model. Under such circumstances group i maximises the following
where V i is based on equation (9). Group j's objective function will be similarly changed in the presence of …xed costs. The addition of the …xed costs will not change any of the equilibrium condition, hence the threshold inequality levels at which the groups start engaging in con ‡ict remains unchanged. The level of con ‡ict, however, will increase taking into account the …xed costs. It is clear from Figure 5 above that, until I a 2 , there will be no con ‡ict due to low inequality. Beyond I a 2 , however, there is a positive amount of con ‡ict by the disadvantaged group. Since to engage in con ‡ict the groups have to incur a …xed cost, we will now …nd a discontinuous jump in the level of con ‡ict at I a 2 . Similarly we will …nd another discontinuous jump at b I a 2 , this time due to the advantaged group engaging in con ‡ict. The discontinuity between inequality and con ‡ict will now be at three levels of inequality: I a 2 , b I a 2 and e I a 2 . Thus around each of these levels there will be sharp changes in the level of con ‡ict. Hence there may be cases with similar levels of anticipated future inequality but very di¤erent levels of con ‡ict.
Conclusion
The purpose of the paper was to analyze the interlinkages between group inequality and con ‡ict. In our analysis we …nd that although inequality may cause con ‡ict, the impact of inequality on con ‡ict is not straightforward. Since con ‡ict is costly for both groups, societies with low levels of inequality, in our model, show no con ‡ict. It is only when inequality increases beyond a threshold, that the disadvantaged group engages in con ‡ict. At higher levels of inequality both groups engage in con ‡ict. Thus, our model is able to capture both rebellion by the disadvantaged group and also suppression by the advantaged group. El Salvador and Guatemala are examples where the state acting on behalf of the advantaged group unleashed severe repression to curb insurgencies. When inequality reaches extreme levels, the economy goes back to subsistence levels as the high output joint production sector is not developed for fear of severe rebellion. For instance, the Bougainville rebellion, arising out of a concern for the local environment and the lack of bene…ts to the local populace, led to the closure of copper mines, thus leading to a decline in the income of the region. 21 It is important to note that the traditional sense of 'grievance'is absent in this model since both groups have the same level of income and wealth in the period in which con ‡ict occurs. Groups, however, anticipate future levels of inequality which may precipitate con ‡ict in the current period. Thus our analysis demonstrates the crucial role future inequality plays. Equality in the current period does not stop con ‡ict from taking place today if the future inequality is signi…cant. In Sri Lanka, for instance, only when the government failed to guarantee the rights of Tamils (and also curtailed their access to higher education), did the Tamil insurgency begin in earnest. 22 The government policies were seen as a potential source of future inequality where the Tamils would lose out signi…cantly.
This brings us to the policy implications of our results. Since the future plays an important role in fostering con ‡ict, one has to put in place policies that will reduce future inequality. For example, the warring factions in Sudan decided to split future pro…ts from the oil wells equally. 23 If such egalitarian rules can be institutionalized and implemented, then reasons for con ‡ict will de…nitely diminish. However, typically if one of the groups becomes 'weaker'(maybe due to exogenous shocks) in terms of bargaining, the stronger groups tend to capture a higher share of the joint output and that is when the problems start again. 24 This may explain why so many peace agreements fail. What is implicit here is that enforceable contracts are not viable and therefore parties cannot forge some kind of ex-ante contract to avoid con ‡ict. If, however, we allow for long-term interaction between the groups, there may be a possibility of overcoming the incomplete contract problem. 25 What the structure will be of such long-term contracts under uncertainty is an issue for future research.
Hence, @f @I 2 = 1 (2 + I a 2 ) 2 1 2 2 < 0 for I 2 0 and 0 < < (1=2)..
We know that for I a 2 2 ; ( C=D) > A, which implies that at I a 2 = 2 ; f > 0. Now consider the level of inequality I 0a 2 such that A = 1. At this level I a 2 > 2 , and A = 1 > ( C=D) (since D > ( C) for all I a 2 ). Hence for I 0a 2 , f < 0. Therefore, by the Intermediate Value Theorem we can …nd an b I a 2 2 (2 ; I 0a 2 ) such that at b I a 2 , f = 0, implying ( C=D) = A. Further, since @f =@I a 2 < 0 for all I a 2 2 , b I a 2 will be unique. Third, we demonstrate that under high inequality the total level of con ‡ict will increase with inequality. Recall that in this case the disadvantaged group reduces its level of con ‡ict and the advantaged group increases its level of con ‡ict, with an increase in inequality.
Proposition A.3 For all I a 2 > b I a 2 , (@n 1 =@I a 2 ) > 0.
Proof: Di¤erentiating both groups'best response functions (i.e. (13) and (14)) with respect to I we get Similarly the result will hold for group j. Since both Finally, we show that when the inequality level becomes excessive, this would lead to own production instead of joint production.
Proposition A.4 When inequality is I a 2 , groups will choose own production over joint production.
Proof: For the high inequality case, whether n j 1 > n i 1 or n j 1 < n i 1 depends on parametric speci…cations. Let us consider the case where n i 1 > n j 1 . Since by de…nition, at I a 2 , max(n i 1 ; n j 1 ) = 1, this implies that at I a 2 , n i 1 = 1 and from (17), n j 1 = ( =4). Using (5) and (9), group i's payo¤ from joint production will then be 
On the other hand group i's payo¤ under own production will be
(1 )w 0 + ( =2)(R 2 + (1 r j ) w 0 ):
Subtracting (A3) from (A2) and rearranging the terms we get since, (1 ) > 0 and 0 < < 1. Therefore group i will drop out of joint production before inequality reaches I a 2 , which would also imply from (1) that group j will also not engage in joint production. Similarly one can also show that when n j 1 > n i 1 , and at I a , n j 1 = 1, group j will prefer own production to joint production and therefore group i will also not engage in joint production. 
